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Abstract
This study analyzes the cross-country e¤ects of monetary policy on innovation and
international technology transfer via cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on R&D invest-
ment. We consider a scale-invariant North-South quality-ladder model that features
innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South. We nd that an in-
crease in the Southern nominal interest rate causes a permanent decrease in the rate
of international technology transfer, a permanent increase in the North-South wage
gap, and a temporary decrease in the rate of Northern innovation. An increase in the
Northern nominal interest rate causes a temporary decrease in the rate of Northern
innovation, a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap, and an ambiguous
e¤ect on the rate of international technology transfer depending on the relative size
of the two economies. We also calibrate the model to China-US data and nd that
the cross-country welfare e¤ects of the CIA constraints are quantitatively signicant.
Specically, permanently decreasing the nominal interest rate to zero in China leads to
a welfare gain of 3.37% in China and a welfare gain of 1.25% in the US. Permanently
decreasing the nominal interest rate to zero in the US leads to welfare gains of 0.33%
in the US and 1.24% in China.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we analyze the cross-country e¤ects of monetary policy on innovation and
international technology transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) in a scale-invariant
North-South quality-ladder growth model that features innovative R&D in the North and
adaptive R&D in the South. Multinational rms invest in adaptive R&D in the South to
transfer the production of the highest quality products from the North to the South in order
to take advantage of the lower Southern wage rate. To model money demand, we impose
cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on R&D investment, which is costly and subject to cash
requirements in reality. For example, early empirical studies show a positive and signicant
relationship between R&D expenditures and cash ows in US rms; see for example, Hall
(1992) and Opler et al. (1999). From 1980 to 2006, the average cash-to-assets ratio in
US rms increased substantially, and Bates et al. (2009) argue that this trend is partly
driven by the rmsincreasing R&D expenditures. Furthermore, rms tend to smooth R&D
expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash reserves; see for
example, Brown and Petersen (2011) for empirical evidence. Berentsen et al. (2012) also
argue that information frictions and limited collateral value of R&D capital require rms to
fund R&D projects with cash reserves by preventing them from nancing R&D investment
through debt or equity. We capture these cash requirements on R&D by imposing CIA
constraints on innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South. Within this
monetary growth-theoretic framework, we derive the following results.
An increase in the nominal interest rate in the South causes a permanent decrease in the
rate of international technology transfer via the Southern CIA constraint on adaptive R&D.
The increase in the Southern nominal interest rate also has the following general-equilibrium
e¤ects: a permanent increase in the North-South wage gap; and a temporary decrease in
the rate of innovation in the North. Intuitively, an increase in the Southern nominal interest
rate raises the cost of adaptive R&D, which in turn reduces the incentives for international
technology transfer. As a result, less products are manufactured by Southern rms and more
products are produced by Northern rms. The higher demand for production labor in the
North reduces R&D labor, which in turn decreases the rate of Northern innovation but only
temporarily, due to the semi-endogenous-growth property of the model. Finally, given that
the increase in the Southern nominal interest rate has a direct negative e¤ect on the demand
for Southern R&D labor, it depresses the wage rate in the South relative to the North.
An increase in the nominal interest rate in the North causes a temporary decrease in
the rate of Northern innovation via the Northern CIA constraint on innovative R&D. The
increase in the Northern nominal interest rate also has the following general-equilibrium
e¤ects: a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap, and an ambiguous e¤ect on the
rate of technology transfer from the North to the South depending on the relative size of the
two economies. Specically, we nd that if the Southern population size is su¢ ciently large
(small), then an increase in the nominal interest rate in the North would cause a permanent
decrease (increase) in the rate of technology transfer from the North to the South. Intuitively,
an increase in the Northern nominal interest rate raises the cost of innovative R&D, which
in turn reduces the incentives for innovation. As a result, the rate of innovation decreases
temporarily. Given that the increase in the Northern nominal interest rate has a direct
negative e¤ect on the demand for Northern R&D labor, it depresses the wage rate in the
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North relative to the South. As for the e¤ects on the rate of international technology transfer,
there are two opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, it reduces the long-run level of aggregate
quality, which reduces the di¢ culty of adaptive R&D due to the property of increasing R&D
di¢ culty in the semi-endogenous growth model.1 This is a positive e¤ect on international
technology transfer. On the other hand, the increase in the Northern nominal interest rate
also reduces the incentives for adaptive R&D because there are less benets from FDI due to
the smaller North-South wage gap. This negative e¤ect on international technology transfer
via adaptive R&D labor in the South is relatively strong when the Southern labor force
is large. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of the Northern nominal interest rate on technology
transfer would be negative (positive) if the Southern population size is su¢ ciently large
(small).
We also calibrate the model to China-US data in order to conduct a quantitative in-
vestigation on the cross-country e¤ects of the CIA constraints. We nd that permanently
decreasing the nominal interest rate to zero in China would reduce the wage gap between
China and the US by about 4% (percent change) and also increase the ow of technology
transfer from the US to China by about 6% (percent change). Furthermore, it leads to a
long-run welfare gain that is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 3.37% in
China and a welfare gain of 1.25% in the US. The welfare gains mostly come from higher
real wages in the two countries as a result of increased quality from innovation. On the
other hand, permanently decreasing the nominal interest rate to zero in the US would raise
the wage gap between the two countries by about 3% and surprisingly decrease the ow of
technology transfer from the US to China by about 2%. The welfare gains for the US and
China are 0.33% and 1.24% respectively. In this case, the welfare gain in the US is relatively
small because the increase in real wage is partly o¤set by a decrease in interest income, which
is an important component of income in the US. Overall, the cross-country welfare e¤ects of
the CIA constraints are quantitatively signicant.
In the literature on ination and economic growth, Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985)
analyze a CIA constraint on capital investment in a monetary version of the Neoclassical
growth model. Subsequent studies in this literature explore the e¤ects of monetary policy in
variants of the capital-based growth model. This study instead associates more closely with a
related literature on ination and innovation-driven growth. In this literature, Marquis and
Re¤ett (1994) analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy via a CIA constraint on consumption in
a variant of the variety-expanding model in Romer (1990).2 In contrast, we analyze monetary
policy in a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model as in Chu and Cozzi (2013) and Chu and Lai
(2013).3 However, the present study di¤ers from all these studies by considering an open-
economy two-country model, which enables us to explore the cross-country e¤ects of the
CIA constraints on innovation and international technology transfer. Furthermore, we nd
that decreasing the Northern nominal interest rate has a sizable welfare e¤ect in the South
even when the welfare e¤ect is small in the North, which is an important insight that cannot
1See Venturini (2012) for empirical evidence based on US manufacturing industry data that supports the
semi-endogenous growth model with increasing R&D di¢ culty.
2Chu, Lai and Liao (2013) provide an analysis of the CIA constraint on consumption in a hybrid growth
model in which economic growth in the long run is driven by both variety expansion and capital accumulation.
3See also Chu and Ji (2013) and Huang et al. (2013), who analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy in a
Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure.
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be obtained in a closed-economy analysis. Chu, Cozzi, Lai and Liao (2013) also analyze the
e¤ects of monetary policy in an open-economy Schumpeterian model, but they consider an
environment with two Northern economies in the absence of North-South product cycles and
technology transfer via FDI that characterize the interesting interaction between developed
and developing economies. To our knowledge, this is the rst study that analyzes the e¤ects
of monetary policy in the presence of North-South product cycles and technology transfer via
FDI. Within this novel monetary growth-theoretic framework, we discover some interesting
e¤ects of the CIA constraints on innovation and international technology transfer.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
solves the steady-state equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy. The
nal section concludes.
2 A North-South monetary Schumpeterian model
The North-South quality-ladder growth model is based on Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010).
The North-South R&D-based growth model originates from the seminal study by Grossman
and Helpman (1991).4 The model in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) is a recent vintage
of this class of models and has the advantage of being free of scale e¤ects by featuring
semi-endogenous growth.5 In the Dinopoulos-Segerstrom model, multinational rms employ
Northern R&D labor to invest in innovative R&D that improves the quality of products
manufactured in the North. In order to take advantage of the lower production cost in the
South, the multinational rms then employ Southern R&D labor to invest in adaptive R&D
that transfers the production of the highest quality products from the North to the South.
After the manufacturing process of a product is transferred to the South, the multinational
rm faces the possibility of the product being imitated by domestic rms in the South. To
introduce money demand, we modify the Dinopoulos-Segerstrom model by incorporating
CIA constraints on innovative R&D in the North and adaptive R&D in the South. Then,
we analyze the e¤ects of the nominal interest rates in the two countries on innovation and
international technology transfer.
2.1 Households
In each country, there is a representative household. The lifetime utility function of the
household in the North is given by
UN =
Z 1
0
e ( gL)t ln cNt dt, (1)
4Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) provide a review of the subsequent development in this literature
that focuses on the e¤ects of intellectual property rights. See also Iwaisako et al. (2011) and Tanaka and
Iwaisako (2013) for recent studies.
5See Jones (1999) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models. The semi-endogenous-
growth version of the quality-ladder model originates from Segerstrom (1998) and Li (2003).
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where cNt denotes per capita consumption in the North at time t, and the parameter  > 0
determines subjective discounting. The population size in the North is LNt , which increases
at an exogenous population growth rate gL > 0. To ensure that lifetime utility is bounded,
we impose the following parameter restriction:  > gL. For simplicity, we make a common
assumption that f; gLg are the same in the two countries. Total population in the world is
Lt = L
N
t +L
S
t . We use s  LSt =Lt to denote the share of world population in the South and
1  s  LNt =Lt to denote the share of world population in the North.
The household in the North maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation
equation:
_ANt + _M
N
t = (i
N
t   gL)ANt   gLMNt + iNt BNt +WNt + TNt   PNt cNt .
PNt is the price of consumption goods denominated in units of domestic currency in the
North. ANt is the nominal value of nancial assets owned by each member of the household,
and iNt is the nominal interest rate in the North. M
N
t is the nominal value of domestic
currency held by each member of the household. BNt is the nominal value of domestic
currency borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs to nance their R&D investment in the North,
and the rate of return on BNt is the domestic nominal interest rate i
N
t .
6 There is a constraint
on how much money that each person can lend to R&D entrepreneurs, and the constraint
is BNt  MNt .7 Each member of the household supplies one unit of labor to earn a nominal
wage WNt . T
N
t is the nominal value of a lump-sum transfer (or tax if T
N
t < 0) from the
government to each person in the North.
For convenience, we reexpress the asset-accumulation equation in real terms (denomi-
nated in units of consumption goods).8
_aNt + _m
N
t = (r
N
t   gL)aNt  
 
Nt + gL

mNt + i
N
t b
N
t + w
N
t + 
N
t   cNt . (2)
aNt is the real value of nancial assets per capita, and r
N
t = i
N
t   Nt is the real interest rate
in the North. Nt is the ination rate of P
N
t in the North. m
N
t is the real value of domestic
currency per capita. bNt is the real value of domestic currency borrowed by domestic R&D
entrepreneurs, and the constraint becomes bNt  mNt . wNt is the real wage rate. Nt is the
real value of lump-sum transfer from the government.
We follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to assume that there is a global nancial
market. In this case, the real interest rates in the two countries must be equal such that
rNt = r
S
t = rt.
9 From standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is10
_cNt
cNt
=
_cSt
cSt
= rt   , (3)
which implies that the growth rate of consumption is the same across countries.
6It can be easily shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the rate of return on BNt must be equal to i
N
t .
7In the case of an additional CIA requirement on consumption, the CIA constraint in the North becomes
PNt c
N
t + B
N
t  MNt . Given that we focus on the case of inelastic labor supply for tractability, the CIA
constraint on consumption would have no e¤ect on the equilibrium allocations.
8Derivations are available upon request.
9The nominal interest rates in the two countries would be di¤erent if ination rates di¤er across countries.
10The representative household in the South also performs an analogous dynamic optimization.
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2.2 Consumption goods
Consumption goods are produced by perfectly competitive rms that aggregate a unit con-
tinuum of intermediate goods Yt(j) using the following CES aggregator:
Ct =
Z 1
0
[Yt(j)]
 1
 dj
 
 1
, (4)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The resource
constraint on Ct is
Ct = c
N
t L
N
t + c
S
t L
S
t =

cNt (1  s) + cSt s

Lt, (5)
where cNt L
N
t is total consumption in the North and c
S
t L
S
t is total consumption in the South.
PNt is the price of consumption goods denominated in units of currency in the North. P
S
t is
the price of consumption goods denominated in units of currency in the South. Given zero
transportation cost, the law of one price holds such that PNt = tP
S
t , where t is the nominal
exchange rate. For convenience, we will express all variables in real terms denominated in
units of consumption goods that have the same value in the two countries. From prot
maximization, we derive the conditional demand function for Yt(j) as
Yt(j) = pt(j)
 Ct (6)
for j 2 [0; 1]. pt(j) is the price of Yt(j).
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods j 2 [0; 1]. Some of these
intermediate goods are produced in the North, and each of these Northern industries is
temporarily dominated by a quality leader until the arrival of the next innovation.11 The
production function of intermediate goods manufactured by a quality leader in the North is
Yt(j) = z
nt(j)LNy;t(j)  Y Nt (j), (7)
where the parameter z > 1 is the step size of a quality improvement, and nt(j) is the
number of quality improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t. The rm
employs LNy;t(j) units of labor in the North for production. Given z
nt(j), the marginal cost
of production for the industry leader is wNt =z
nt(j).12 We follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(2010) to assume that new quality leaders are always able to charge the unconstrained
monopolistic price because the closest competitors choose to immediately exit the market in
equilibrium.13 In this case, the monopolistic price charged by industry leaders is
pt(j) =

   1
wNt
znt(j)
 pNt (j). (8)
11This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect in the literature; see Cozzi (2007a) for a discussion.
12It is useful to note that we here adopt a cost-reducing view of quality improvement.
13See Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) for a detailed discussion.
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To take advantage of the lower labor cost in the South (i.e., wNt > w
S
t ), industry leaders
in the North invest in adaptive R&D in the South in order to shift the manufacturing
process to the South. If the adaptive R&D project of a Northern leader is successful, then
a Southern a¢ liate of the Northern leader would start producing the intermediate goods.
The production function of intermediate goods manufactured by the foreign a¢ liate of a
Northern quality leader is
Yt(j) = z
nt(j)LFy;t(j)  Y Ft (j). (9)
The Southern a¢ liate employs LFy;t(j) units of labor in the South for production, and the
marginal cost of production is wSt =z
nt(j). Given the marginal cost of production, the uncon-
strained monopolistic price is given by
pt(j) =

   1
wSt
znt(j)
 pFt (j). (10)
The Southern a¢ liate produces the intermediate goods until the arrival of the next innovation
in the North or until the current innovation is imitated by other rms in the South. When
the next innovation arrives, the manufacturing process shifts back to the North. To ensure
that this return of production to the North occurs, we follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(2010) to assume wSt > w
N
t =z, so that new quality leaders are able to drive out Southern
a¢ liates of previous quality leaders.
Technologies of Southern a¢ liates may be imitated by other Southern rms subject to
an exogenous imitation rate . When this imitation occurs, the intermediate goods are
produced by competitive rms in the South. The production function of intermediate goods
produced by competitive rms in the South is
Yt(j) = z
nt(j)LSy;t(j)  Y St (j), (11)
and the perfectly competitive price is given by the marginal cost of production:
pt(j) =
wSt
znt(j)
 pSt (j). (12)
Southern competitive rms produce the intermediate goods until the next innovation arrives
at which point the manufacturing process shifts back to the North.
Lets dene the aggregate quality index across industries j 2 [0; 1] as
Qt 
Z 1
0
qt(j)dj,
where qt(j) 

znt(j)
 1
. Then, we can derive the labor demands for an average-quality
product produced by a Northern leader as
~LNy;t = Qt


   1w
N
t
 
Ct, (13)
by a Southern a¢ liate as
~LFy;t = Qt


   1w
S
t
 
Ct, (14)
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and by Southern competitive rms as
~LSy;t = Qt
 
wSt
 
Ct. (15)
Using these expressions, we can then express the labor demand for product j as
Loy;t(j) =
qt(j)
Qt
~Loy;t; (16)
where o = fN;F; Sg. The amount of monopolistic prot earned by a Northern leader is
Nt (j) =
wNt
   1
qt(j)
Qt
~LNy;t, (17)
and the amount of monopolistic prot earned by a Southern a¢ liate is
Ft (j) =
wSt
   1
qt(j)
Qt
~LFy;t. (18)
2.4 Innovative and adaptive R&D
Innovative R&D is performed by a continuum of competitive entrepreneurs in the North.
If an R&D entrepreneur employs LNr;t(j) units of Northern labor to engage in innovative
R&D in industry j, then she is successful in inventing the next higher-quality product in the
industry with an instantaneous probability given by
'Nt (j) =
LNr;t(j)
qt(j)
, (19)
where the parameter  > 0 inversely measures innovation productivity. qt(j) captures the
e¤ect of increasing innovation di¢ culty, and it removes the scale e¤ect in the innovation
process of the quality-ladder model as in Segerstrom (1998). The expected benet from
investing in innovative R&D is vNt (j)'
N
t (j)dt, where v
N
t (j) is the real value of the expected
discounted prots generated by an innovation and 'Nt (j)dt is the entrepreneurs probability of
having a successful innovation during the innitesimal time interval dt. To facilitate the wage
payment to R&D labor in the North, the entrepreneurs needs to borrow domestic currency
from the domestic household, and the cost of borrowing is determined by the nominal interest
rate iNt in the North. Therefore, the total cost of innovative R&D is
 
1 + iNt

wNt L
N
r;t(j)dt.
Free entry implies
vNt (j)'
N
t (j)dt =
 
1 + iNt

wNt L
N
r;t(j)dt, vNt (j) =
 
1 + iNt

wNt qt(j), (20)
where the second equality uses (19).
Adaptive R&D is performed by Northern industry leaders and their Southern a¢ liates.
If the Southern a¢ liate of a Northern leader in industry j employs LFr;t(j) units of South-
ern labor to engage in adaptive R&D, then the Northern rm is successful in shifting the
production to the Southern a¢ liate with an instantaneous probability given by
'Ft (j) =
LFr;t(j)
qt(j)
, (21)
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where the parameter  > 0 inversely measures adaptation productivity. qt(j) captures the
e¤ect of increasing adaptation di¢ culty, and it removes the scale e¤ect in the adaptation
process as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010). The expected net benet for the Northern
leader to invest in adaptive R&D is

vFt (j)  vNt (j)

'Ft (j)dt, where v
F
t (j) is the real value
of the expected discounted prots generated by the Southern a¢ liate and 'Ft (j)dt is the
probability of having a successful adaptation during the innitesimal time interval dt. To
facilitate the wage payment to R&D labor in the South, the Southern a¢ liate needs to borrow
domestic currency from the domestic household, and the cost of borrowing is determined by
the nominal interest rate iSt in the South. Therefore, the total cost of adaptive R&D is 
1 + iSt

wSt L
F
r;t(j)dt. Given that the net benet of adaptive R&D is linear in L
F
r;t(j), the
Southern a¢ liate engages in a positive nite amount of adaptive R&D if and only if the
following equilibrium condition holds:
vFt (j)  vNt (j)

'Ft (j)dt =
 
1 + iSt

wSt L
F
r;t(j)dt, vFt (j)  vNt (j) =
 
1 + iSt

wSt qt(j), (22)
where the second equality uses (21). Finally, Southern a¢ liates face the risk of imitation
(with an exogenous probability  > 0) by other rms in the South.
2.5 Stock market
The no-arbitrage condition that determines the value of vNt (j) is given by
14
rt =
Nt (j) 
 
1 + iSt

wSt L
F
r;t(j) + _v
N
t (j)  'Nt (j)vNt (j) + 'Ft (j)

vFt (j)  vNt (j)

vNt (j)
. (23)
This condition equates the real interest rate rt to the asset return per unit of asset. The
asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prots net of adaptive R&D expenditure, (b)
any potential capital gain _vNt (j), (c) the expected capital loss  'Nt (j)vNt (j) from creative
destruction, and (d) the expected change in asset value 'Ft (j)

vFt (j)  vNt (j)

when adaptive
R&D is successful. Using (22), we simplify (23) to a more familiar expression given by
rt =
Nt (j) + _v
N
t (j)  'Nt (j)vNt (j)
vNt (j)
. (24)
The no-arbitrage condition that determines the value of vFt (j) is given by
rt =
Ft (j) + _v
F
t (j)  ['Nt (j) + ]vFt (j)
vFt (j)
. (25)
This condition equates the real interest rate rt to the asset return per unit of asset. The
asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prots in the South, (b) any potential capital
gain _vFt (j), (c) the expected capital loss  'Ft (j)vFt (j) from creative destruction, and (d) the
expected capital loss  vFt (j) from imitation.
From (19), the expected benet from innovative R&D in industry j is vNt (j)'
N
t (j) =
vNt (j)L
N
r;t(j)=[qt(j)], which appears to be decreasing in qt(j). However, (24) implies that
14It is useful to note that the following Nt (j) refers to the prot after the arrival of the next innovation.
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vNt (j) is linearly increasing in 
N
t (j) which in turn is linearly increasing in qt(j) as shown
in (17); as a result, vNt (j)'
N
t (j) is in fact independent of qt(j). Therefore, we follow the
standard treatment in this class of models to focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which
'Nt (j) = '
N
t .
15 Similarly, from (21), the expected benet from adaptive R&D in industry
j is

vFt (j)  vNt (j)

'Ft (j) =

vFt (j)  vNt (j)

LFr;t(j)=[qt(j)], which is also independent of
qt(j) as implied by (25) and (18). Therefore, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which
'Ft (j) = '
F
t .
2.6 Monetary authority
The monetary policy instrument in the North (South) is the domestic nominal interest rate
iNt (i
S
t ), which is exogenously chosen by the Northern (Southern) monetary authority. Given
iNt (i
S
t ), the ination rate in the North (South) is endogenously determined according to the
Fisher identity Nt = i
N
t  rt (St = iSt  rt), where rt is the global real interest rate. Then, the
growth rate of the nominal money supply per capita in the North (South) is endogenously
determined by _MNt =M
N
t = 
N
t + _m
N
t =m
N
t ( _M
S
t =M
S
t = 
S
t + _m
S
t =m
S
t ). Finally, the Northern
(Southern) monetary authority returns the seigniorage revenue as a lump-sum transfer that
has a real value of Nt = ( _M
N
t + gLM
N
t )=P
N
t (
S
t = ( _M
S
t + gLM
S
t )=P
S
t ) to each member of
the domestic household in the North (South).
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fcNt ; cSt ; Ct; Y Nt (j); Y Ft (j); Y St (j); LNy:t(j); LFy:t(j);
LSy:t(j); L
N
r:t(j); L
F
r:t(j)g1t=0, a time path of prices fwNt ; wSt ; pNt (j); pFt (j); pSt (j); vNt ; vFt ; tg1t=0
and a time path of monetary policies fiNt ; iSt g1t=0. Also, at each instance of time,
 the representative household in the North maximizes lifetime utility taking frt; iNt ; wNt g
as given;
 the representative household in the South maximizes lifetime utility taking frt; iSt ; wSt g
as given;
 competitive consumption-good rms produceCt to maximize prot taking fpNt (j); pFt (j);
pSt (j)g as given;
 quality leaders in the North choose pNt (j) and produce Y Nt (j) to maximize prot taking
wNt as given;
 a¢ liates in the South choose pFt (j) and produce Y Ft (j) to maximize prot taking wSt
as given;
15See Cozzi (2007b) for a discussion on the possibility of multiple equilibria in the Schumpeterian growth
model. Cozzi et al. (2007) provide theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique
rational-expectation equilibrium in the Schumpeterian growth model.
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 competitive intermediate goods rms produce Y St (j) to maximize prot taking fpSt (j); wSt g
as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs in the North employ LNr:t(j) to do innovative R&D
taking fiNt ; wNt ; vNt g as given;
 quality leaders in the North and their a¢ liates in the South employ LFr:t(j) to do
adaptive R&D taking fiSt ; wSt ; vFt g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for consumption goods holds;
 the market-clearing conditions for labor hold in both countries.
3 Steady-state equilibrium
In this section, we proceed to solve the steady-state equilibrium in the following steps. First,
we derive the steady-state number of each type of industries and the steady-state expression
of the quality index. Then, we derive the steady-state labor market conditions in the two
countries. Finally, we put all these conditions together to derive the steady-state equilibrium
rates of technology transfer and innovation.
3.1 Industry composition and quality dynamics
In the intermediate goods sector, there are three types of industries in which intermedi-
ate goods are produced respectively by Northern quality leaders, Southern a¢ liates, and
Southern competitive rms. We use fN ; F ; Sg to denote the steady-state measure of these
three types of industries. To solve for these three endogenous variables, we use the following
conditions. First, the measure of all industries adds up to one.
N + F + S = 1. (26)
In the steady state, the ows in and out of each type of industry must be equal. The ow
into industries S dominated by Southern competitive rms is F given by the measure of
industries in which Southern a¢ liatestechnologies are imitated. The ow out of industries
S dominated by Southern competitive rms is S'N given by the measure of these com-
petitive industries experiencing the arrival of new innovations in the North. Therefore, the
second condition is
F = S'N . (27)
The ow into industries F dominated by Southern a¢ liates is N'F given by the measure
of industries in the North experiencing successful R&D adaptation. The ow out of industries
F dominated by Southern a¢ liates is the sum of (a) F'N given by the measure of these
industries experiencing the arrival of new innovations in the North and (b) F given by the
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measure of industries in which Southern a¢ liatestechnologies are imitated. Therefore, the
third condition is
N'F = F ('N + ). (28)
Solving (26), (27) and (28) yields
N =
'N
'N + 'F
, (29)
F =
'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F
, (30)
S =

'N + 
'F
'N + 'F
. (31)
The aggregate quality index across industries j 2 [0; 1] is
Qt 
Z 1
0
qt(j)dj =
Z 1
0
nt(j)dj, (32)
where   z 1 is a composite parameter that is increasing in the quality step size z. This
quality index can be decomposed into the following three components:
Qt = Q
N
t +Q
F
t +Q
S
t =
Z
N
qt(j)dj +
Z
F
qt(j)dj +
Z
S
qt(j)dj. (33)
Lemma 1 provides the steady-state expression for the share of each of these three components
of aggregate quality.
Lemma 1 In the steady state, the three components of aggregate quality can be expressed as
QNt
Qt
=
'N
'N + 'F
, (34)
QFt
Qt
=
'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F
. (35)
QSt
Qt
=

'N + 
'F
'N + 'F
. (36)
Proof. See Appendix A.
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3.2 Northern labor market
The market-clearing condition for labor in the North is given by
LNt =
Z
Nt
LNy;t(j)dj +
Z 1
0
LNr;t(j)dj. (37)
The amount of labor employed for production by Northern quality leaders isZ
Nt
LNy;t(j)dj =
Z
Nt
qt(j)
Qt
~LNy;tdj =
QNt
Qt
~LNy;t, (38)
where the rst equality uses (16). The amount of labor employed for innovative R&D isZ 1
0
LNr;t(j)dj = '
N
t
Z 1
0
qt(j)dj = '
N
t Qt, (39)
where the rst equality uses (19) and the symmetry condition 'Nt (j) = '
N
t . We dene x
N
t
as the average quality per Northern worker such that
xNt 
Qt
LNt
.
Finally, substituting (34), (38) and (39) into (37) yields the steady-state Northern labor-
market condition expressed in per-capita terms given by
1 =
'N
'N + 'F
~LNy;t
Lt
1
1  s + '
NxN , (40)
where we also have used LNt = (1  s)Lt.
3.3 Southern labor market
The market-clearing condition for labor in the South is given by
LSt =
Z
St
LSy;t(j)dj +
Z
Ft
LFy;t(j)dj +
Z
Nt
LFr;t(j)dj. (41)
The amount of labor employed for production by Southern competitive rms isZ
St
LSy;t(j)dj =
Z
St
qt(j)
Qt
~LSy;tdj =
QSt
Qt
~LSy;t, (42)
where the rst equality uses (16). The amount of labor employed for production by Southern
a¢ liates is Z
Ft
LFy;t(j)dj =
Z
Ft
qt(j)
Qt
~LFy;tdj =
QFt
Qt
~LFy;t, (43)
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where the rst equality also uses (16). The amount of labor employed for adaptive R&D by
Southern a¢ liates is Z
Nt
LFr;t(j)dj = '
F
t
Z
Nt
qt(j)dj = '
F
t
QNt
Qt
Qt, (44)
where the rst equality uses (21) and the symmetry condition 'Ft (j) = '
F
t . Substituting
(34)-(36) and (42)-(44) into (41) yields the steady-state Southern labor market condition
expressed in per-capita terms given by
1 =
'F
'N + 'F
 

'N + 
~LSy;t
LSt
+
'N
'N + 
~LFy;t
LSt
+ 'N
Qt
LSt
!
, (45)
where Qt=LSt = x
NLNt =L
S
t = x
N(1  s)=s and

'N + 
~LSy;t
LSt
+
'N
'N + 
~LFy;t
LSt
=


'N + 


   1

+
'N
'N + 

| {z }
()
~LFy;t
Lt
1
s
,
which uses (14), (15) and LSt = sLt. It is useful to note that () is increasing in .
3.4 Innovation and technology transfer
We rst derive the growth rate of the quality index. Di¤erentiating (32) with respect to time
yields
_Qt =
Z 1
0
h
nt(j)+1   nt(j)
i
'Nt dj = (  1)'Nt Qt. (46)
Then, taking the log of xNt = Qt=L
N
t and di¤erentiating with respect to time yields
_xNt
xNt
=
_Qt
Qt
 
_LNt
LNt
= (  1)'Nt   gL. (47)
In the steady state, xNt is stationary implying that the steady-state arrival rate of innovation
is
'N = gL= (  1) , (48)
which is determined by exogenous parameters in this semi-endogenous growth model. As
discussed in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), the law of motion in (47) implies that any
increase (decrease) in the steady-state level of xN must be associated with a temporary
increase (decrease) in 'Nt during the transition path. Therefore, if a parameter increases
(decreases) xN in the long run, it must have increased (decreased) 'Nt in the short run.
Using (24) and (25), one can show that the balanced-growth values of assets are16
vNt (j) =
Nt (j)
+ 'N
, (49)
16Derivations are available upon request.
14
vFt (j) =
Ft (j)
+ 'N + 
. (50)
Substituting (17) and (49) into (20) yields the following steady-state innovative R&D con-
dition:
(   1)(+ 'N)  1 + iN  = ~LNy;t
Qt
=
1
(1  s)xN
~LNy;t
Lt
, (51)
where the second equality is obtained by multiplying ~LNy;t=Qt by 1 = (Lt=Lt)(L
N
t =L
N
t ).
Similarly, substituting (17), (18), (49) and (50) into (22) yields the following steady-state
adaptive R&D condition:
(   1)(+ 'N + )  1 + iS +  1 + iN ! = ~LFy;t
Qt
=
1
(1  s)xN
~LFy;t
Lt
, (52)
where !  wNt =wSt is the relative wage between the two countries. Using (6)-(10) and (16),
we derive
~LFy;t
Lt
= !
~LNy;t
Lt
. (53)
Substituting (51) and (52) into (53) yields the following steady-state relative-wage condition:
+ 'N
+ 'N + 
!   ! =
 
1 + iS


(1 + iN) 
, (54)
which is an implicit function determining the steady-state equilibrium value of the relative
wage !(iN ; iS). It can be shown using (54) that !(iN ; iS) is decreasing in iN and increasing
in iS. Given  > 1, it is easy to show that ! > 1. Then, to ensure that z > !,17 we impose
the following parameter restriction:
+ 'N
+ 'N + 
z   z >
 
1 + iS


(1 + iN) 
. (P1)
Substituting (51) into (40) to eliminate ~LNy;t=Lt yields the Northern steady-state condition
given by
1 = xN

(   1) (+ 'N) '
N
'N + 'F
 
1 + iN

+ 'N

. (55)
The Northern steady-state condition contains two endogenous variables fxN ; 'Fg18 and is
positively sloped in the (xN ; 'F ) space with a positive xN -intercept. Substituting (52) into
(45) to eliminate ~LFy;t=Lt yields the Southern steady-state condition given by
1 =
xN'F (1  s)=s
'N + 'F

(   1)  + 'N +   1 + iS +  1 + iN !(iN
 
; iS
+
)

() + 'N

.
(56)
The Southern steady-state condition also contains two endogenous variables fxN ; 'Fg and
is negative sloped in the (xN ; 'F ) space with no intercepts. Finally, (55) and (56) are the
17z > ! is equivalent to wS > wN=z.
18Recall that 'N = gL= (  1) in the steady state.
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two conditions that implicitly solve for the steady-state equilibrium values of fxN ; 'Fg.
Graphically, xN and 'F are determined by the intersection of the North curve and the South
curve in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The steady-state equilibrium
3.5 Social welfare
In this section, we derive the steady-state level of social welfare in each country, which we
will use to simulate the welfare e¤ects of the CIA constraints in the quantitative analysis.
Imposing balanced growth on (1) yields the steady-state welfare of the Northern household
given by
UN =
1
  gL

ln cN0 +
gc
  gL

, (57)
where gc = gL=(   1) is determined by exogenous parameters due to semi-endogenous
growth. Therefore, the steady-state welfare is determined by the balanced-growth level of
consumption. Substituting the lump-sum transfer Nt from the government into (2) yields
cNt = (rt   _aNt =aNt   gL)aNt + iNt bNt + wNt .
Therefore, the balanced-growth level of consumption cN0 is given by the sum of (a) asset
income (   gL)aN0 , (b) interest income iNbN0 ,19 and (c) wage income wN0 . An analogous
derivation applies to the steady-state welfare of the Southern household. To determine aN0
and aS0 , we need to impose an assumption on the distribution of assets. Following Dinopoulos
and Segerstrom (2010), we assume that the asset from innovative R&D in the North is owned
by the Northern household whereas the asset from adaptive R&D in the South is owned by
19Interest income iNbN appears in the budget of the household because together with R&D labor income
(captured by wage income wN ), it represents the cost of R&D that is paid to the household.
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the Southern household. Under this assumption, we show in Lemma 2 that the balanced-
growth levels of consumption can be expressed as cN0 = w
N
0 I
N and cS0 = w
S
0 I
S, where
fIN ; ISg denote income as a ratio of real wages because asset income and interest income
are proportional to fwN0 ; wS0 g.
Lemma 2 The balanced-growth level of consumption can be expressed as
cN0 = w
N
0 I
N =
 
	LN0 x
N
 1
 1 IN , (58)
cS0 = w
S
0 I
S =
 
	LN0 x
N
 1
 1
!
IS, (59)
where LN0 is exogenous and f	; IN ; ISg are given by
	 =
'N
'N + 'F

   1

 1
| {z }
Northern leaders
+
'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F

   1

 1
! 1| {z }
Southern a¢ liates
+

'N + 
'F
'N + 'F
! 1| {z }
Southern competitive rms
,
IN = (  gL)
 
1 + iN

xN

'N
'N + 'F
+
'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F

| {z }
asset income
+ iN'NxN| {z }
interest income
+ 1|{z}
wage income
,
IS = (  gL)(1 + iS)xN

'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F

1  s
s| {z }
asset income
+iS'FxN
'N
'N + 'F
1  s
s| {z }
interest income
+ 1|{z}
wage income
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition of the above expressions can be explained as follows. Recall that real wages
are given by wN0 =
 
	LN0 x
N
 1
 1 and wS =
 
	LN0 x
N
 1
 1 =!; therefore, the term 	 captures
the quality contributions of Northern leaders, Southern a¢ liates, and Southern competitive
rms to consumption through the real wage. As for the terms IN and IS, they represent the
contributions of the di¤erent sources of income to consumption.
4 Monetary policy and the CIA constraints
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy via the CIA constraints. Section
4.1 analyzes the e¤ects of the nominal interest rates in the two countries on the equilibrium
rates of innovation and international technology transfer. In Section 4.2, we calibrate the
model to provide a quantitative analysis.
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4.1 Qualitative analysis
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy. An increase in the Southern nominal
interest rate iS a¤ects only the Southern steady-state condition in (56). Specically, it shifts
the South curve to the left in Figure 1. As a result, both 'F and xN decrease along with an
increase in ! as implied by (54). Intuitively, an increase in the nominal interest rate iS in
the South raises the cost of adaptive R&D and reduces the equilibrium rate of international
technology transfer 'F . The decrease in the number of products manufactured by Southern
a¢ liates implies more products being produced by Northern rms. The higher demand for
production labor causes a reallocation of labor in the North from R&D to production. The
decrease in innovative R&D in the North decreases the rate of innovation in the short run
and leads to a lower average quality per worker xN in the long run. Finally, given that
the increase in iS has a direct negative e¤ect on the demand for Southern R&D labor, it
depresses the wage rate in the South relative to the North. We summarize these results in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 An increase in the nominal interest rate in the South leads to (a) a perma-
nent decrease in the rate of technology transfer from the North to the South, (b) a permanent
increase in the North-South wage gap, and (c) a temporary decrease in the rate of innovation
in the North.
Proof. See Appendix A.
An increase in the Northern nominal interest rate iN a¤ects both the Northern and
Southern steady-state conditions in (55) and (56). Specically, it shifts both the South
curve and the North curve to the left in Figure 1. As a result, the e¤ect on 'F is ambiguous,
and xN decreases along with a decrease in ! as implied by (54). Intuitively, an increase in
the nominal interest rate iN in the North raises the cost of innovative R&D. As a result,
the rate of innovation decreases in the short run, and the average quality per worker xN
decreases in the long run. Given that the increase in iN has a direct negative e¤ect on the
demand for Northern R&D labor, it depresses the wage rate in the North relative to the
South.
As for the e¤ect of iN on the rate of international technology transfer 'F , there are two
opposing e¤ects. To see this, we use 'Ft (j) = '
F
t and integrate (21) over 
N
t to derive
'Ft =
1
QNt
Z
Nt
LFr;t(j)dj =
1
xNt
Z
Nt
LFr;t(j)dj
Qt
QNt
1
(1  s)Lt , (60)
where the second equality uses xNt = Qt=L
N
t and L
N
t = (1 s)Lt. In the steady state, QNt =Qt
is given by (34), and hence, (60) can be reexpressed as
'N'F
'N + 'F
=
1
xN
Z
N
LFr;t(j)dj
1
(1  s)Lt , (61)
where the left-hand side is monotonically increasing in 'F . From (61), we see that the
Northern nominal interest rate iN a¤ects 'F via the quality level per worker xN and the
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number of adaptive R&D workers
R
N
LFr;t(j)dj. On the one hand, an increase in i
N reduces
xN and has a positive e¤ect on 'F by decreasing the di¢ culty of adaptive R&D. On the
other hand, the increase in iN also reduces the incentives for adaptive R&D by changing the
asset values. To see this, we combine (49) and (50) to derive
vFt (j)
vNt (j)
=
+ 'N
+ 'N + 
Ft (j)
Nt (j)
=
+ 'N
+ 'N + 

wNt
wSt
 1
, (62)
where the second equality uses (17)-(18) and then (13)-(14). Recall that the increase in iN
reduces the relative wage ! = wNt =w
S
t ; therefore, it also reduces v
F
t (j)=v
N
t (j). In other words,
the decrease in the North-South wage gap makes adaptive R&D less attractive relative to
innovative R&D. This leads to a decrease in adaptive R&D in the South, which in turn has a
negative e¤ect on the rate of international technology transfer 'F . This negative e¤ect of iN
via the number of adaptive R&D workers in the South is relatively strong when the Southern
population size s is large. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of iN on 'F would be negative if s is
su¢ ciently large, and vice versa. We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 An increase in the nominal interest rate in the North leads to (a) a tem-
porary decrease in the rate of innovation in the North, (b) a permanent decrease in the
North-South wage gap, and (c) a permanent decrease (increase) in the rate of technology
transfer to the South if Southern population size is su¢ ciently large (small).
Proof. See Appendix A.
4.2 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we provide a quantitative analysis on the e¤ects of the CIA constraints.
Specically, we are interested in their welfare implications. As is well known in the literature,
the Schumpeterian growth model features positive externalities, such as the consumer-surplus
and intertemporal-spillover e¤ects, and negative externalities, such as the business-stealing
e¤ect as a result of creative destruction. In other words, it is ex ante unclear as to whether the
equilibrium would feature too much or too little R&D; see for example, Jones and Williams
(2000) and Comin (2004). Chu and Cozzi (2013) show that in a closed-economy Schum-
peterian model, when the equilibrium features R&D overinvestment, the optimal nominal
interest rate may be positive in order to weaken the negative externalities. Even when the
optimal nominal interest rate is zero (i.e., the Friedman rule holds), the positive and negative
externalities of R&D a¤ect the size of welfare gains from reducing the nominal interest rates.
The purpose of this section is to provide an illustrative numerical experiment to quantify
the welfare e¤ects of the CIA constraints.
For the parameter values, we either set them to conventional values in the literature or
calibrate them using empirical moments from aggregate data of China and the US. In the
above qualitative analysis, we obtain the realistic pattern of production shifting back to the
North upon the arrival of new innovations by imposing z > ! using the parameter restriction
in (P1). However, it is unlikely for z > ! to hold in the data; for example, the China-US
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wage gap (approximated by the relative GDP per worker) is 6.354 in 2010. Although the
literature does not provide a precise empirical estimate of the quality step size z, it is unlikely
to exceed this value. Nevertheless, we do observe a pattern of o¤shoring and reshoring in
reality. For example, in a recent survey, the Boston Consulting Group (2011) document
that "[t]ransportation goods such as vehicles and auto parts, electrical equipment including
household appliances, and furniture are among seven sectors that could create 2 to 3 million
jobs as a result of manufacturing returning to the U.S." The reason is that despite the much
lower wages in China, there are other costs associated with production in China that our
model does not capture. Therefore, although our calibrated parameter values imply z < !,
we carry out the simulation by assuming that whenever a higher-quality product is invented
in the North, it must dominate the market initially and be produced in the North until its
manufacturing process is transferred to the South. This assumption allows the model to
deliver a realistic pattern of o¤shoring and reshoring between the US and China.
For the discount rate , we set it to a conventional value of 0.03. For the population
growth rate gL, we set it to the average population growth rate of 0.0114 in the US from
1991 to 2011.20 For the relative Southern population size s, we set it to 0.811 based on
data from the Penn World Table on the population size of China and the US in 2010. For
the quality step size z, we follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to consider a value of 1.05.
For the imitation rate , we calibrate it by matching the relative wage ! from the model
to the data. We use data from the Penn World Table on the relative GDP per worker
between the US and China as an approximated value of !, and this value is 6.354 in 2010.
In the model, it is = (rather than the individual values of  and ) that determines the
values of variables in equilibrium.21 We calibrate = by using the R&D share of GDP in
the US relative to the R&D share of GDP in China.22 According to the OECD Research
and Development Statistics, the average R&D share of GDP is 0.0110 in China and 0.0257
in the US from 1991 to 2011.23 For the substitution elasticity , we calibrate it by using
the innovation arrival rate 'N , and we follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to consider 3
years as the expected duration of time between arrivals of any two consecutive innovations
in an industry. The calibrated value of  is 1.7, which is slightly less than the estimate in
Broda and Weinstein (2006).24 Finally, we calibrate iS and iN using average ination rates
in China and the US, and S is 4.841% and N is 2.625% from 1991 to 2011 according
to the World Bank Development Indicators. Under these calibrated parameter values, the
equilibrium values of fxN ; 'Fg are respectively 1.790 and 0.0609. We provide a summary of
the calibration in Table 1.
20We consider the population growth rate in the US (instead of China) because it determines the steady-
state rate of innovation that is driven by R&D in the US.
21xN is the only variable a¤ected by , but the equilibrium value of xN is independent of . Given that
it is the value of xN that matters, we simply normalize  to one when reporting the value of xN .
22Unfortunately, our model is unable to match the absolute R&D share of GDP in each country. As
discussed in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), R&D-based growth models usually imply too much R&D in
equilibrium compared to the data; see their footnote 26.
23The data series for China is available only from 1991 to 2011.
24In Broda and Weinstein (2006), the median estimate of the elasticity of substitution is 2.2 for three-digit
industries based on data from 1990 to 2001.
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Table 1: Calibration
Parameters  z  =  iS iN gL s
0.03 1.050 0.131 10.378 1.698 0.095 0.073 0.0114 0.811
Variables r gc ! R&D
N=S 'N S N xN 'F
0.0464 0.0164 6.354 2.341 0.330 4.841% 2.625% 1.790 0.0609
Given these calibrated parameter values, we consider the following experiments: (a)
decreasing the Southern nominal interest rate iS to zero, and (b) decreasing the Northern
nominal interest rate iN to zero. The results are reported in Table 2. We nd that a
permanent decrease in the nominal interest rate in China to 0% would reduce the wage gap
! by about 4% (percent change) and increase technology transfer 'F by about 6% (percent
change). It also leads to a long-run welfare gain of 3.37% in China and a welfare gain of
1.25% in the US.25 In this case, the welfare gains in the two countries mostly come from
the increase in real wages as a result of increased quality from innovation. A permanent
decrease in the nominal interest rate in the US to 0% would raise the wage gap ! by about
3% and decrease technology transfer 'F by about 2%. Here 'F decreases despite an increase
in adaptive R&D because of the increase in the di¢ culty index xN . The e¤ect of xN on 'F
dominates because s is not su¢ ciently large despite the rather large population in China.
The decrease in iN also leads to a welfare gain of 0.33% in the US and a welfare gain of 1.24%
in China. In this case, the welfare gain in the US is relatively small because the increase
in real wage in the North is o¤set by a decrease in interest income, which is an important
component of income due to the relatively large amount of assets owned by the Northern
household. In contrast, the real wage is by far the most important component of income for
the Southern household. To conclude, we nd that the cross-country welfare e¤ects of the
CIA constraints are quantitatively signicant.
Table 2: Simulation
iS ! xN 'F  lnwN0  lnw
S
0  ln c
N
0  ln c
S
0
0.095 6.354 1.790 0.0609 - - - -
0 6.089 1.797 0.0648 1.225% 5.483% 1.245% 3.371%
iN ! xN 'F  lnwN0  lnw
S
0  ln c
N
0  ln c
S
0
0.073 6.354 1.790 0.0609 - - - -
0 6.569 1.839 0.0598 4.530% 1.206% 0.328% 1.237%
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the e¤ects of monetary policy via CIA constraints on R&D
investment in a Schumpeterian economy with North-South product cycles. We show that
the CIA constraints a¤ect innovation, technology transfer and the allocation of manufac-
turing activities across countries. Furthermore, calibrating the model to China-US data,
we nd that the cross-country welfare gains from decreasing the nominal interest rates are
quantitatively signicant. For example, decreasing the nominal interest rate to zero in China
25Welfare changes are all expressed in the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
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would lead to a long-run welfare gain of 1.25% in the US, whereas decreasing the nominal
interest rate to zero in the US would lead to a long-run welfare gain of 1.24% in China.
These results highlight the quantitative signicance of cross-country spillover e¤ects of the
CIA constraints.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. As in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), the dynamics of the quality
indices is given by
_QNt =
Z
Nt
h
nt(j)+1   nt(j)
i
'Nt dj +
Z
Ft +
S
t
nt(j)+1'Nt dj  
Z
Nt
nt(j)'Ft dj
= (  1)'Nt QNt + 'Nt
 
QFt +Q
S
t
  'Ft QNt ,
_QFt =
Z
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nt(j)'Ft dj  
Z
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Z
Ft
nt(j)dj
= 'Ft Q
N
t   'Nt QFt   QFt ,
_QSt =
Z
Ft
nt(j)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QFt   'Nt QSt .
Lets dene QFSt  QFt + QSt , which implies _QFSt = 'Ft QNt   'Nt QFSt . Setting _QNt =QNt =
_QFSt =Q
FS
t yields (34), using Q
FS
t = Qt   QNt . Setting _QFt =QFt = _QSt =QSt yields QSt =Qt = 
QFt =Qt
 
=
 
'Nt

, noting QFSt =Q
N
t =
 
1 QNt =Qt

=(QNt =Qt) = '
F
t =
 
'Nt

: Applying
this to QFt =Qt +Q
S
t =Qt = 1 QNt =Qt and using (34), equations (35) and (36) follow.
Proof of Lemma 2. Time arguments are omitted for convenience. Using N = ( _MN +
gLM
N)=PN and _MN=MN = N + _mN=mN , we derive N =
 
N + gL

mN + _mN . Substi-
tuting this condition into the balanced-growth version of (2) yields
cN = (  gL) aN + iNwN'NxN + wN , (A1)
where we have used rN = +gL=( 1), _aN=aN = gL=( 1) andmN = bN =
R 1
0
wN'Nq(j)dj=LN =
wN'NxN . Following Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), we assume that the Northern
household nances innovative R&D in equilibrium. That is, LNaN =
R
N+F
vN(j)dj. Given
that vN(j) =
 
1 + iN

wNq(j) from (20), we have
aN =
 
1 + iN

xNwN

'N
'N + 'F
+
'N
'N + 
'F
'N + 'F

, (A2)
which uses Lemma 1. Using (A1) and (A2), we can show that cN = wNIN , where IN
is dened in Lemma 2. By incorporating (8), (10) and (12) into the aggregate price in-
dex
R
[pt(j)]
1  dj
	1=(1 )
= 1, we can show that the real wage in the North is wN = 
	LNxN
 1
 1 , which uses Lemma 1 and xN = Q=LN . 	 is dened in Lemma 2, and
we have derived (58). Applying analogous derivations to the Southern asset condition,
one can also derive (59) by noting that mS = bS =
R
N
wS'Fq(j)dj=LS and LSaS =R
F

vF (j)  vN(j) dj, which comes from the assumption that the Southern household -
nances adaptive R&D and that vF (j)  vN(j) =  1 + iSwSq(j) from (22).
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Proof of Proposition 1. It is easy to graphically show from (54) that ! increases with
iS, proving (b). Given this, an increase in iS leads to a downward shift in the South curve
(56), whereas it has no e¤ect on the North curve (55). Applying a simple graphical analysis
to Figure 1, we nd that an increase in iS leads to permanent decreases in 'F and xN .
This proves (a) and also (c) because a permanent decrease in xN must be associated with a
temporary decrease in the innovation rate 'Nt below its steady-state level '
N = gL=(  1)
given the dynamics in (47).
Proof of Proposition 2. Graphical analysis with (54) implies that ! decreases with
iN , proving (b). An increase in iN leads to a downward shift in both the North and South
curves, (55) and (56), given that we can easily show from (54) that
 
1 + iN

! increases with
iN . Thus, an increase in iN leads to a decrease in xN , implying a temporary decrease in the
innovation rate 'Nt given the dynamics in (47) and proving (a). As for (c), we solve (55) and
(56) for 'F to obtain26
'F = 'N
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(1 + iN)!()  1
 1
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
s
1 s   
 . (A3)
Di¤erentiating (A3) with respect to iN , we nd that d'F=diN > (<) 0 holds if the following
inequality holds:27
!(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. (A4)
Given that the right-hand side of (A4) is monotonically increasing in s, d'F=diN > (<) 0
becomes more likely to hold as s decreases (increases). Given that s has an upper bound
~s,28 which ensures 'F > 0, we can show that the inequality < in (A4) must hold as s ! ~s
implying that d'F=diN < 0 for a su¢ ciently large s. As s! 0, the right-hand side of (A4)
becomes negative. Therefore, d'F=diN > 0 holds if the left-hand side of (A4) is positive,
which is guaranteed by = > z'N=(+ 'N) given that z > !.
26Here we have used the following condition derived from (54):
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